The Elasticity of Taxable Income during the 1990s: New Estimates and Sensitivity Analyses by Giertz, Seth H
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Economics Department Faculty Publications Economics Department 
10-2010 
The Elasticity of Taxable Income during the 1990s: New 
Estimates and Sensitivity Analyses 
Seth H. Giertz 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, sgiertz2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub 
 Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Public Economics Commons 
Giertz, Seth H., "The Elasticity of Taxable Income during the 1990s: New Estimates and Sensitivity 
Analyses" (2010). Economics Department Faculty Publications. 70. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub/70 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University 
of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Faculty Publications by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Published in Southern Economic Journal 77:2 (2010), pp. 406-433.
Submitted November 2007; accepted September 2009. 
The author wishes to thank David Weiner, Ed Harris, Bob Dennis, Doug Hamilton,  
Tom Woodward, Emmanuel Saez, Chris Bollinger, and three anonymous referees for  
Southern Economic Journal for their comments and assistance. 
The Elasticity of Taxable Income during the 
1990s: New Estimates and Sensitivity Analyses 
Seth H. Giertz 
Department of Economics, CBA 368, P.O. Box 880489, University of Nebraska–Lincoln,  
Lincoln, NE 68588- 0489  USA; email sgiertz2@unl.edu 
Abstract 
Over the past two decades, the elasticity of taxable income has emerged as the central 
parameter for assessing efficiency and revenue implications from changes to tax policy. 
This article estimates short- and longer-run responses of taxable (and gross) income to 
changes in tax rates using panels of U.S. tax returns for the 1990s. With the richest set of 
income controls, income-weighted elasticity estimates range from 0.19 to 0.33, depending 
on whether responses are measured over one- or three-year intervals. An alternative ap-
proach designed to capture delayed and anticipatory responses yields much larger esti-
mates—ranging from 0.43 over the short term and from 0.78 to 1.46 over the longer term. 
A continuing obstacle to identification encountered here is that the income controls most 
likely to control for mean reversion and divergence within the income distribution are also 
the most likely to absorb independent variation in tax rates, also needed for identification. 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency by distorting 
relative prices, often between leisure and all other goods in the economy. Even a broad-based 
income tax can have substantial efficiency costs, so long as leisure remains untaxed. Harberger 
(1964) uses this as motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indi-
rect taxation. In so doing, he shows how labor supply elasticities can be used to measure the 
efficiency implications of income taxation.1 Harberger’s analysis had a profound influence on 
public and labor economists, spurring increased research into labor supply elasticities, which 
were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from taxation. 
More than two decades after Harberger, economists began to emphasize the variety of 
other margins over which taxes can distort behavior, in addition to hours worked. These econ-
omists noted that these other behavioral responses may too have important implications for 
efficiency. An important building block in the evolution of this literature was set forth by 
Slemrod (1990), who presented a hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation. Slemrod di-
vided behavior into three categories based on their responsiveness to taxes. His least respon-
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1. Specifically, it is the compensated elasticity (or the substitution component of the overall elasticity) that is im-
portant for measuring efficiency. Compensated elasticities measure the portion of the overall response attrib-
utable to changes in relative prices (as opposed to the portion of the response due to changes in income). 
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sive category, real responses, includes individuals changing consumption and work patterns 
and businesses altering investment and production decisions. Second, in order of responsive-
ness is circumvention, which includes both illegally (evasion) and legally (avoidance) bypass-
ing the tax system.2 In the case of evasion, income is concealed from tax authorities—or fac-
tors that offset tax liabilities, such as expenses and deductions, are inflated (beyond what is 
legally permitted). In the case of avoidance, income is shifted in order to receive more favor-
able tax treatment. Diverting income into a tax-deferred retirement account is an example of 
avoidance.3 Included in circumvention is the expenditure (of time and money) necessary to 
avoid or evade taxation. Third on the hierarchy—and the most responsive—is the timing of in-
come receipt, which includes “pulling” the receipt of income into the previous year or “push-
ing” it into the next in order to take advantage of more favorable tax treatment (while not al-
tering real behavior).4 Slemrod further recognizes that the type of behavioral response could 
have implications for both tax revenue and tax incidence—and in some cases efficiency. 
Predating Slemrod’s insights, Lindsey (1987) produced elasticity estimates for taxable in-
come—although what Lindsey termed taxable income more closely approximates adjusted 
gross income (AGI)—instead of labor supply.5 Lindsey’s estimated elasticities were much 
larger than the labor supply literature would have suggested. Lindsey emphasized the rev-
enue implications of the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) but not its efficiency implications. 
Building on Slemrod and Lindsey, Feldstein (1995) produced ETI estimates but went much 
further than Lindsey in describing the behaviors that could affect taxable income. He argued that 
many of these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities. Furthermore, Feldstein 
posited that (income) taxation creates economic inefficiency not only by distorting the relative 
price between labor and leisure but more broadly by distorting the relative price between goods 
or activities that are taxed and those that are not taxed since leisure is not the only untaxed ac-
tivity. For example, in response to taxes, not only work hours but also work effort might change. 
Compensation can shift between taxed forms and untaxed forms. When tax rates are higher, 
more compensation is paid in tax-exempt fringe benefits instead of wages. And economic activ-
ity may shift from jurisdictions with more burdensome taxes to others where taxes are more fa-
vorable; evasion is another response to taxation that confers deadweight loss but does not imply 
increased leisure. Over the long run, taxes may also distort investment decisions, including how 
much education to pursue and in what occupations to specialize. 
Next, Feldstein (1999) showed that the ETI along with information on marginal tax rates 
and income is all that is necessary to calculate changes in both tax revenue and efficiency.6 
2. What I term “circumvention” Slemrod terms “avoidance responses.” I use the former term because some au-
thors use avoidance to refer only to legal maneuvers, which would not include evasion. 
3. Following Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), “avoidance” refers to avoiding the tax but not avoiding the activity. 
For example, choosing leisure is one way to avoid paying income tax. but that decision falls under real substi-
tution and not avoidance because the consumption bundle has changed as a result of the tax. 
4. Here also, timing is another form of avoidance but is classified separately because the timing of income re-
ceipt is believed to respond differently to tax changes than other forms of avoidance (with respect to both the 
size and the persistence of the responses). 
5. The elasticity of taxable income measures the percent change in taxable income associated with a 1% increase 
in the net-of-tax rate (NTR), where the NTR equals one minus the marginal tax rate (MTR). Sometimes the 
NTR is also referred to as the “after-tax share.” 
6. There are caveats to this, and, in many instances, assessing the efficiency and revenue implications from a tax 
change is complex. For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response, taxable income falls, but a portion of 
that drop in taxable income is due to increased charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce 
positive externalities). Or suppose that a tax increase is used to finance an underprovided public good. In 
any instance where fiscal externalities are present, assessing efficiency implications is more complex (Chetty 
2009b). 
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In Harberger’s model, labor is the only source of income, all income is taxed when earned, 
and thus taxable income equals labor income; therefore, the ETI with respect to the tax rate 
is the same as the labor supply elasticity—or at least the elasticity of labor earnings since la-
bor hours and labor earnings may be imperfectly correlated because of factors such as work 
effort. 
The beauty of Feldstein’s (1995, 1999) papers is that it is not necessary to separately mea-
sure all the underlying behaviors that influence taxable income. All these behaviors have ef-
ficiency implications, and, in equilibrium, the costs associated with a $1.00 change to tax-
able income, at the margin, are always equal (to the marginal tax rate). However, more 
recent research highlights instances where the manner in which taxpayers respond could 
have important (efficiency and revenue) implications. And understanding the anatomy of 
behavioral responses is important for tax policy design. For example, on efficiency grounds, 
one may want to tax more heavily income sources that are least responsive to taxation—
just as Ramsey (1927) suggests taxing goods proportionally to the inverse of their demand 
elasticities. 
While Feldstein (1995) spawned dozens of subsequent papers and the ETI is now a cen-
tral parameter in tax policy discussions, there is no consensus as to the size of the ETI.7 The 
earliest studies (Lindsey 1987; Feldstein 1995) suggested an ETI ranging between 1 and 3, al-
though, as discussed later, most now believe that these early estimates are substantially bi-
ased upward. While the most widely cited ETI estimates are now much lower, often around 
0.4, credible estimates range from 0 to 1—and some studies report estimates in excess of 1 for 
very high income groups. Where the ETI lies within this wide range of estimates has tremen-
dous consequences for the efficiency and revenue implications from changes to tax rates. In 
fact, in examining the major components of the “Bush” tax cuts, Giertz (2009) uses a range of 
ETI estimates from the literature to show how allowing the individual income tax rate cuts to 
expire—scheduled to occur after 2010—might affect economic efficiency and tax revenues. Gi-
ertz finds the deadweight loss per additional dollar of tax revenue from the increase in federal 
income tax rates to range from $0.19 at an ETI of 0.2 to $1.72 at an ETI of 0.8—that is, an ETI of 
0.8 implies nine times the deadweight loss (per dollar of additional federal revenue) than does 
an ETI of 0.2. Note that at an ETI of 0, this measure equals 0 (i.e., changes to tax rates have 
no efficiency implications), and once the revenue-maximizing (or Laffer) tax rate is reached, 
this measure equals infinity. Giertz estimates that an ETI of 0.8 implies a total revenue off-
set of 63.3% versus 15.8% at an ETI of 0.2 (both compared to the potential gain in federal rev-
enues with no behavioral responses). These estimates include offsets to payroll and state in-
come taxes (whose bases overlap with the federal income tax base). 
The majority of research in the U.S. taxable income elasticity literature has focused on the 
1980s tax cuts. However, research that does exist on the 1990s suggests that responses for 
the two decades may be dissimilar. Giertz (2007) reports estimated elasticities for the 1990s 
that are over one-third smaller than analogous estimates for the 1980s. Additionally, work by 
Slemrod (1996), Goolsbee (1999), and Saez (2004) all suggests great variation in the ETI across 
time periods. However, Chetty (2009a) shows that variation in estimates across tax changes 
does not necessarily imply that the true ETI is changing over time but could instead reflect 
costs of reoptimizing. If taxpayers imperfectly optimize, Chetty shows that a range of ETI esti-
mates could all be consistent with a single true ETI. 
7. In fact, as Kopczuk (2005) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) posit, the ETI is. at least to a degree, a choice 
variable and not a structural parameter. They argue that the ETI is a function of many factors, including the 
institutional features of a tax system, which establish rules for deductions and credits as well as policies to-
ward evasion. 
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This article revisits the 1990s tax increases using panels of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
tax return data for years 1984, 1985, and 1988-1995. These data heavily oversample high-in-
come filers, which research suggests play a critical role in determining overall responses to 
changes in tax rates (Navratil 1995; Moffitt and Wilhelm 2000; Gruber and Saez 2002; Saez 
2004). I find that when employing the richest set of income controls, estimates are larger for 
the longer term than for the short term.8 As is common in this literature, sample income cut-
offs (or floors) are imposed in order to lessen influences from mean reversion on the esti-
mates. When imposing a $50,000 income cutoff, the income-weighted estimated ETI is 0.33 
when measuring responses over three-year intervals compared to 0.19 when measuring be-
havior over single-year intervals. Including separate controls for both mean reversion and 
divergence in the income distribution substantially alters estimated ETIs over the longer 
term but not for the short term. Employing the specification favored by Gruber and Saez 
(2002) yields a negative estimated ETI when employing single-year differences; when dif-
ferencing over three-year intervals. Gruber and Saez’s specification yields an ETI estimate 
of 0.54—the largest ETI estimate (from the specifications that include just one tax rate vari-
able among the explanatory variables). An alternative approach that includes lead and lag 
tax rate changes produces a short-term elasticity estimate of 0.43 and a longer-term estimate 
ranging from 0.78 to 1.46, Income weighting is important. Unweighted estimates are much 
smaller than income-weighted estimates and suggest at most a very modest ETI. This also 
suggests that the ETI increases with income— consistent with several other articles in the 
ETI literature. 
A broader underlying conclusion from this article is that it is incredibly difficult to iso-
late responses to changes in tax rates from income changes due to myriad other complex fac-
tors. While flexible income controls are intended to control for both mean reversion and di-
vergence within the income distribution, it is impossible to conclude that these problems are 
adequately mitigated. Furthermore, the flexibility of the income controls likely absorbs inde-
pendent variation in tax rates (since income tax rates are also a function of income), which 
hampers identification. 
2. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 
The two major tax changes examined in this article are the Omnibus Budget and Recon-
ciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1990 and 1993. Both tax changes, for the most part, raised income 
tax rates on tax filers in the top 1% of the income distribution while not changing tax rates for 
those in the lower brackets. 
As reflected in Figure 1, OBRA 90 raised the top federal marginal income tax rate from 28% 
to 31% beginning in 1991. Additionally, the bill raised the cap on wages subjected to Social Se-
curity’s hospital insurance tax—which is used to fund Medicare and amounts to 2.9% when 
including both the employee and employer share—from $53,400 to $125,000. The change in 
the cap resulted in higher MTRs on earned income for some in the top income decile but not 
8. In most ETI studies, it is more accurate to refer to estimated elasticities as either “short term” or “longer 
term” (as opposed to “long term”). Long-term responses may be the most important but could take many 
years before responses are fully observed. These types of changes (which may include some human capi-
tal and occupation decisions as well as more traditional investment) are currently beyond the scope of the 
ETI literature. For that reason, this article eschews the label “long term” in favor of “longer term” in order 
to distinguish these estimates from short-term elasticities while also recognizing that they are not truly long 
term. 
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for any in the top 1%. The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent federal income plus payroll tax 
rates. While OBRA 90 generally raised tax rates for top income groups, the bill also lowered 
marginal tax rates for some filers. Filers in the so-called bubble bracket prior to OBRA 90 gen-
erally saw their marginal income tax rate fall from 33% to 31%.9 
OBRA 93 created two new high-income tax brackets, at rates of 36% and 39.6%. Addition-
ally, the cap on wages and salaries subjected to the Social Security hospital insurance cap was 
completely lifted. Those in the lower tax brackets were not directly affected by the bill’s key 
provisions. OBRA 93’s new tax brackets were retroactive and applied for 1993. The removal of 
the hospital insurance cap did not take effect until 1994. OBRA 93 represented a sharp increase 
in tax rates for the top 1%, with the average effective NTR for the top 1% falling by about 15%. 
Chetty (2009a) argues that if individuals imperfectly optimize, they are much more likely to 
respond to a tax change when the benefits of doing so are great. Chetty shows that, for top in-
come groups, the benefits from reoptimizing in response to most tax changes over the past few 
decades would have only very modest benefits. In such instances, even modest “optimization 
frictions” (i.e., costs associated with reoptimizing) could imply an upper bound from an ETI 
estimate of 0 that exceeds 1. With the exception of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), OBRA 
93 is the only tax change over the past few decades that, in the presence of optimization fric-
tions, may yield ETI bounds for the top 1% that are meaningful. 
3. Data and Methods 
Data on individual tax returns for years 1984, 1985, and 1988-1995 are from the Statistics 
of Income (SOI). The SOI data are large stratified random samples of tax returns that heav-
ily oversample high-income tax filers—in fact, sampling rates reach 100% for filers at the very 
Figure 1. Effective Marginal Tax Rates. 
Source: Effective federal income tax rates are from Saez (2004). Payroll tax rates are imputed by the author. State 
tax rates are not included. 
9. Prior to OBRA 90, those with incomes beyond the 33% bracket faced marginal tax rates of 28%. These filers 
were moved to the 31% bracket after OBRA 90. 
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top of the income distribution. SOI data are compiled by the IRS and include all information 
reported on filers’ tax returns, plus additional demographic information. SOI’s panel data are 
confidential and not available to the public.10 A panel of tax filers (not used in this article) 
was made public for the years 1979-1990. This panel, the public-use version of the Contin-
uous Work History Survey (CWHS), was balanced (with some minor exceptions) and thus 
did not oversample high-income groups—and throughout the income distribution generally 
maintained much lower sampling rates than the full SOI data set. A big drawback to the pub-
lic-use CWHS, in addition to its ending in 1990, is the dearth of tax filers at the top of the in-
come distribution. For some tax questions, this means that estimates for key parameters may 
be driven by just handful of filers. For example, the top income group examined by Feldstein 
(1995) using these data included just 57 observations. The absence of publicly available U.S. 
panel data since 1990 has severely limited the ability of academic researchers to study more re-
cent tax changes—an obstacle that this article overcomes. For more background on SOI data, 
see the Appendix. 
Constructing Three Samples 
The analysis relies on three panels constructed from SOI data so as to conform to the three 
key methodological variants—that is, first-differenced observations are created by pairing ob-
servations over one-, three- and six-year intervals. Estimates based on differencing over a sin-
gle year are intended to capture short-term responses (including the retiming of income re-
ceipt). The other intervals are used to estimate longer-term responses, after filers have more 
time to respond. The approach is presented in detail later in this section. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for each of the three samples. Each sample includes 
only filers with taxable income greater than $10,000 whose filing status does not change over 
the sample period. The sample for the year-to-year analysis (designed to capture short-run re-
sponses to changes in tax rates) is composed of 99,421 paired observations (14,203 filers) and 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Year to Yeara  Three-Year Intervals  End Years 
Paired observations  99,421  157,083  31,142 
Differencing: years between base 
   and subsequent observation  1 3   6 
Returns with base-year taxable  
    income greater than: 
    $1,000,000  7006  26,128 6013 
    $5,000,000   1822   5775 1456
Mean taxable incomeb  $36,566  $34,877  $41,360
Mean gross incomeb $51,827    $55,749 $60,047
Mean federal tax rate  24.1   23.6  24.6
Mean state tax rate  4.8   4.4  4.5
Mean net-of-tax rate  71.1    72.0 70.9 
Estimates are based on SOI data from 1989 to 1995. 
a. The year-to-year sample excludes those who are not observed every year. 
b. Incomes are expressed in 1992 dollars, as adjusted by the growth in gross income. 
10. The IRS’s SOI division has recently implemented a program that may allow a limited number of researchers 
access to SOI tax return data while maintaining strict controls to ensure taxpayer privacy. 
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spans the years 1989-1995. Mean taxable income (in 1992 dollars and adjusted by sampling 
weights) is 536,566, and mean gross income is $51,827. The sample is restricted to fliers pres-
ent in every year from 1989 to 1995.11 This restriction should not be particularly important 
since, as discussed below, observations in the regression analysis are weighted by the inverse 
of their probability of appearing in the sample. 
The next sample is used to capture longer-term responses by measuring changes over 
three-year intervals; thus, this sample includes base years 1989-1992 (i.e., the first year of each 
paired observation). The third sample uses just two years of data, comparing changing be-
tween end years 1989 and 1995. For these two samples, the flier must be present in the base 
and subsequent year, but the filers are not required to be present in every year (from 1989 
to 1995). The sample based on differences over three-year intervals is composed of 157,083 
paired observations. Mean taxable income is $34,877, and gross income is $55,749 (in 1992 dol-
lars and adjusted by sampling weights). The sample used to examine behavior between end 
years includes 31,142 paired observations. Mean taxable income is $41,360, and gross income 
is $60,047 (in 1992 dollars and adjusted by sampling weights). For comparison, data from 1985 
and 1989 are used to estimate ETIs for TRA 86. This sample used to evaluate TRA 86 includes 
37,673 filers.12 
Methodology 
Beginning with Feldstein (1995), the vast majority of panel studies examining the ETI have 
employed some form of differences-in-differences estimation. Simple first differences— com-
paring two periods (one before a tax change and one after) and then dividing the percent 
change in taxable income by the percent change in the NTR—would result in valid elasticity 
estimate if the only changes in income between the two periods were due to the tax change. 
However, many other factors also influence income. The task for identifying the tax response 
rests in finding a “control” group (used for the second difference) that is not subject to the tax 
change (or one that is subject to a different tax change). Of course, no true control group ac-
tually exists. Thus, a second-best solution becomes finding a pseudo control group that did 
not experience the same tax change and whose non-tax-related income trends are very simi-
lar. This is no simple task because mean reversion and non-tax-related income trends appear 
to have heterogeneous influences across the income distribution (see Piketty and Saez 2003). 
While both phenomena are characterized by income changes over time, there is an important 
distinction between them. Mean reversion refers to a “reshuffling” of the income distribution, 
while the distribution itself does not change. On the other hand, exogenous (non-tax-related) 
income trends refer to changes to the income distribution. 
Even if income trends, absent tax changes, are heterogeneous when comparing groups 
experiencing a tax change to others not experiencing a change, the groups not experiencing 
a tax change may still serve as an effective control group if exogenous income trends for the 
two groups are similar after conditioning on control variables. Because these heterogeneous in-
come trends were not well understood when the ETI literature emerged, the earliest stud-
ies did not attempt to control for this phenomenon. This likely biased estimates by Lind-
sey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) upward since the more rapid growth in income by those at 
11. Filers in each sample must also be present in 1988 because data from this year are used in constructing the 
independent variables. 
12. Auten and Carroll (1999) also employ a variation of this approach using similar data for the years 1985 and 
1989. Their set of control variables and income restrictions are not the same, however. 
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the top of the income distribution was positively correlated with an increasing NTR because 
top income groups generally experienced the largest decrease in their tax rates (i.e., increase 
in their NTRs). Mean reversion at the top would tend to bias estimates for the 1980s in the 
other direction; however, mean reversion did not affect Lindsey’s study because he used re-
peated cross sections and not panel data. While Feldstein did use panel data, Slemrod (1996) 
and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) argue that his estimates may also have been biased upward 
due to income shifting from Subchapter C corporations (which is generally not observed at 
the individual level) to Subchapter S corporations (where income is taxed at the individual 
level and not subjected to the corporate income tax). For many upper-income taxpayers, cor-
porate tax rates were lower than individual rates prior to TRA 86. while the reverse was true 
post-TRA 86. 
The ETI with Respect to the NTR versus the MTR 
With rare exceptions, the ETI literature measures elasticities with respect to the NTR and 
not the MTR. Maybe the NTR is favored because it is analogous to the wage rate often used 
in the labor supply literature. The (after-tax) wage rate is what a worker receives for an addi-
tional hour of work; the NTR is what a taxpayer keeps when receiving an additional dollar of 
taxable income. There is nothing inherently wrong with measuring responses with respect to 
the MTR instead of the NTR. However, comparing estimates with respect to the two differ-
ent variables is not always straightforward, even though the two measures are related. The 
taxable income (T I) elasticity with respect to the NTR can be expressed where ETI1 – τ = 
[dTI/d(1 – τ)] × [(1 – τ)/T I], which is equivalent to –(dTI/dτ) × [(1 – τ)/(T I)]. The correspond-
ing elasticity with respect to the MTR is ETIτ = (dTI/dτ) × (τ/T I). Thus, ETIτ multiplied by Z 
equals ET I1 – τ, where Z × (dT I/dτ) ×(τ/T I) = –(dT I/dτ) × [(1 – τ)/T I)] and Z = [(τ – 1)/τ]. Note 
that simply multiplying estimates by –1 will often result in misleading comparisons.  
Regression Specification 
The estimating equation compares individual-level changes in income and NTRs measured 
over one-, three-, or six-year intervals. The equation is estimated via two-stage least squares 
and can be expressed as follows: 
ln ( incomeit+k ) = t + ξ ln ( 1 – τit+k ) + f (incomeit, incomeit–1) β + Xiγ + εit                   (1)                     incomeit                           1 – τit
The dependent variable is the log of income for individual i in subsequent year k (incomeit+k) 
divided by income in base year t (incomeit), where the subsequent year is either one, three, or 
six years after the base. The key independent variable equals the log of the NTR in the same 
subsequent year (1 – τit+k) divided by the NTR in the base year (1 – τit), where τ is the sum of ef-
fective federal, payroll, and state MTRs.13 While the goal of the regression analysis is to iden-
tify the influence of tax rates on income, tax rates are also a function of income and thus not 
exogenous. This simultaneity issue is resolved by employing two-stage least squares and in-
cluding an exogenous instrument for the NTR (whose construction is discussed later). The co-
13. In addition, Gruber and Saez (2002) include a variable to separate the income effect from the substitution ef-
fect. They conclude that the income effect is not important and thus exclude it from most of their analysis. 
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efficient ξ represents the ETI. In addition, the analyses also include year fixed effects (t) plus 
demographic information (Xi), including age, gender, marital status, and itemization status. 
And functions of income in the base year and the year prior to the base (f(incomeit, incomeit–1)) 
are included in order to control for mean reversion and non-tax-related divergence in the in-
come distribution. 
Finally, an alternative approach is used to estimate both longer- and short-term elasticities. 
This specification builds on the year-to-year model by including as explanatory variables both 
a one-year lag and a one-year lead in the log change of the NTR, in addition to the concurrent 
log change in the NTR. The estimating equation becomes 
          ln ( incomeit+1 ) = t + ξ0 ln ( 1 – τit+1 ) + ξ1 ln (  1 – τit  )+ ξ2 ln ( 1 – τit+2 )                   incomeit                             1 – τit                     1 – τit–1                 1 – τit+1
+  f (incomeit, incomeit–1) β + Xiγ + εit                                                 (2)
     
where ξ1 and ξ2 represent the coefficients for the lagged change in the NTR and the lead 
change in the NTR, respectively. This approach is similar to that employed by Goolsbee 
(2000) when examining behavioral responses by executives to the 1990s tax changes. (Gools-
bee’s approach has also been employed by Hall and Liebman [2000] and Eissa and Giertz 
[2006].) Goolsbee’s data were in log form and not differenced (although, in some specifi-
cations, he includes individual fixed effects). He included the lead tax rate but not the lag. 
Goolsbee interpreted estimates for ξ0 to be short-term (or transitory) responses and ξ0 + ξ2 
as the longer-term (or permanent) response. ξ2 could account for behavioral changes in an-
ticipation of a prospective tax change, which could either raise the longer-term elasticity or 
lower it by capturing an offsetting response that could counterbalance a one-time intertem-
poral reallocation of income. Analogously, ξ1 could capture a delayed response to the tax 
change. In such instances, a broader measure of the ETI becomes ξ0 + ξ1 + ξ2. Including the 
lead rate change might be particularly relevant for the 1993 tax increase since the tax change 
should have been anticipated; President Clinton campaigned on such an increase in the year 
prior to becoming president. 
However, another plausible interpretation exists for the coefficients on the lead and lagged 
rate changes. Even excluding the possibility of a delayed tax response, the lag [ln(incomet/in-
comet–1)] is potentially important if, for example, the NTR falls from year t – 1 to base year t 
and individuals respond by shifting income from t to t – 1, making year t income smaller than 
otherwise. If rates also change from year t to t + 1, this shifting could bias the estimated con-
current tax response. Analogously, the lead rate change [ln(incomet+2/incomet+1)] instead of or 
in addition to capturing an anticipatory response, could account for income shifting (resulting 
from a concurrent tax response in another period) between the year t + 1 and year t + 2.14 For 
example, suppose that for some the NTR falls between year t + 1 and t + 2; individuals may be 
induced to pull income back to t + 1, making concurrent income growth (between t and t + 1) 
larger than otherwise. 
14. Recall that in the 1990s, marginal tax rates (on earned income) increased for some taxpayers in both 1993 and 
1994. 
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Income Measures 
Two different income measures are examined. The most comprehensive measure is gross 
income, where gross income = total income – adjustments15 – capital gains – supplemental 
(Schedule E) income or loss + dividends excluded from AGI + unemployment compensation 
not included in AGI + Keogh and traditional IRA contributions + forfeited interest penalties + 
alimony paid. 
The other measure is taxable income, which equals gross income less exemptions and 
the greater of the standard or itemized deductions. Social Security benefits are excluded be-
cause they are not fully observed in all years. As with most studies in this literature, cap-
ital gains are excluded from the analysis. The relationship between capital gains realiza-
tions and tax rates is an important question; however, including capital gains in the income 
measure poses several complications. Capital gains are observed only when they are real-
ized and not when they accrue—thus, changes in capital gains realizations do not neces-
sarily reflect changes in investment. Capital gains realizations have proven extremely dif-
ficult to model and likely respond differently to changes in tax rates than do other income 
sources (see Congressional Budget Office [CBO] 2006). Burman and Randolph (1994) recon-
cile evidence from time-series data (showing only modest responsiveness of capital gains to 
changes in marginal tax rates) with evidence from individual-level data (finding very large 
elasticities). They argue that the smaller elasticities are picking up “permanent” (or longer-
term) responses to tax rates, while the larger elasticities reflect transitory (or short-term) re-
sponses.16 Additionally, the tax rate applying to capital gains is often different from the rate 
applying to other income-although this could potentially be modeled by including a sepa-
rate variable for changes to the capital gains tax rate. Note that over the period examined in 
this article, statutory federal tax rates on capital gains do not change. However, taxpayers 
may choose to realize gains in years when their other income is unusually low in order to 
take advantage of the lower tax rates. 
Income measures are defined according to 1990 law and adjusted by growth in gross in-
come, with 1992 as the point of reference.17 Over time, both tax rates and the definition of tax-
able income itself change. For example, deductions and exemptions permitted in some years 
are not allowed in others. The definition of income can affect responses to changes in tax rates 
(Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002). Additionally, Heim (2007) shows that changes to allowable ex-
clusions and deductions can bias estimates, even when using a constant law definition of tax-
able income, unless the cross-price elasticities between activities whose tax status has changed 
and those that have not are zero—or known and taken into account. In contrast to the tax 
changes of the 1980s, the tax changes of the early 1990s were associated with only very minor 
changes to the definition of taxable income. 
15. Adjustments are subtracted from total income to calculate AGI. Adjustments include certain education ex-
penses, student loan interest, and contributions to traditional IRAs. 
16. The massive increase in capital gains realizations prior to the implementation of the TRA 86 (which raised 
tax rates on capital gains realizations) is cited as evidence of the short-term responsiveness. 
17. The adjustment for gross-income growth is analogous to adjustments that transform nominal dollars into 
real dollars. Thus, for this article, each individual’s reported income is multiplied by the ratio of average gross 
income in 1992 over the average gross income in the year of the observation. 
416 sE th h. gi E r tz i n Sou th er n ec on om i c Jou r na l 77 (2010) 
Short- and Longer-Run Responses 
The interval over which behavior is measured could have implications for the size of re-
sponses. Whether responses increase or decrease with time is theoretically ambiguous. For ex-
ample, some real behavior and shifting between income sources may take time to respond. It 
may take years before labor and housing markets fully adjust to tax changes. Similarly, the be-
havioral literature suggests that people might delay altering their savings behavior (Madrian 
and Shea 2001). Furthermore, while income can be shifted between sources (e.g., between Sub-
chapter C and Subchapter S, as mentioned earlier), these decisions may be costly to reverse, 
and some may delay making changes until they better understand the costs and benefits of 
such changes. On the other hand, responses, such as the timing of income receipt, might re-
spond immediately to a tax change, but these changes may be temporary—which could in-
crease short-term ETIs without affecting longer-run ETIs. 
The year-to-year analysis is intended to capture short-term behavior. Several have docu-
mented these timing responses for the 1990s (Parcell 1995; Feldstein and Feenberg 1996; Sam-
martino and Weiner 1997; Goolsbee 2000). Examining behavior over three-year intervals is in-
tended to capture longer-term (or more permanent) responses. The end-year approach is also 
intended to focus on longer-term responses. By excluding observations from years adjacent 
to tax changes, this approach should not be influenced by timing responses. Using end years 
has the drawback that it excludes potentially valuable sources of variation. For example, data 
on income changes for other pairs of years (some for which tax rates did not change) may be 
helpful in constructing baseline income trends, which are necessary for identifying the tax re-
sponse. In fact, Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) argue that in many circumstances it may be 
impossible to identify tax responses with just two years of data. 
Income Controls 
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) highlight the obstacles that heterogeneous income trends 
and mean reversion pose to the identification of tax elasticities. If these phenomena are not ac-
counted for, they are likely to overwhelm tax responses.18 Therefore, in addition to a specifi-
cation with no income controls, six alternative controls are explored where f(incomet, incomet–1) 
in Equation 1 represents the following:19 
A. The log of base-year income 
B. The log of income in the year prior to the base year and the difference in logs between base-
year income and income in the year prior to the base 
C. A 10-piece spline of the log of base-year income 
D. A 10-piece spline of the log of income in the year prior to the base year and the difference in 
logs between base-year income and income in the year prior to the base 
18. Because both phenomena are defined by income patterns, the variables used to control for them are both 
based on income (or lagged income). This makes it difficult to isolate the influence of each factor. 
19. Alternatives A and C are the same as those employed by Gruber and Saez (2002). Alternatives B and D 
through F were employed by Kopczuk (2005). Both studies used the public-use version of the CWHS, focus-
ing on the 1980s. 
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E. The log of income in the year prior to the base year and a 10-piece spline of the difference in 
logs between base-year income and income in the year prior to the base 
F. A 10-piece spline of the log of income in the year prior to the base year and a 10-piece 
spline of the difference in logs between base-year income and income in the year prior to 
the base. 
Alternatives A and B include controls for either income in the base year or for both in-
come in the year prior to the base and the change in income in the year prior to the base. Al-
ternative B has the advantage over alternative A in that it includes separate controls for mean 
reversion and for divergence within the income distribution. However, both alternatives al-
low only for a linear relationship between the nontax factors and income growth. The CBO 
(2001), Piketty and Saez (2003), and others show heterogeneous rates of income growth across 
the income distribution during the past few decades (and including the 1990s). Growth rates 
are much greater (and more volatile) at the very top of the income distribution and do not in-
crease linearly with income. For years 1989-1995, the share of income accruing to the bottom 
99% of taxpayers (whom for the most part did not experience a federal tax change and rep-
resent the potential “control” group pool) is relatively stable, decreasing by just 0.9%, while 
the share of income accruing to the top 1% increases by 5.9% despite rising tax rates. This pecu-
liarity in the evolution of the income distribution has reduced the efficacy of some otherwise 
sound econometric techniques—such as differences-in-differences. Diverging income trends 
suggests that income growth for a group not experiencing a tax change may be a poor coun-
terfactual for another group that is experiencing a tax change. And the jaggedness of these di-
verging trends suggests that assuming that a group facing a tax change would have experi-
enced income growth similar to what they had experienced over other years, when taxes did 
not change, may also be specious. 
In the 1990s, when the NTR was generally falling for top incomes, imposing a linear con-
trol for income growth due to nontax factors (a nonlinear phenomenon) would likely attri-
bute too little of the income growth at the top of the distribution to nontax factors. Those at 
the top of the distribution are one of the driving forces behind the overall response. Thus, 
linear controls, by overestimating the counterfactual income trend (i.e., the trend the “treat-
ment” group would have followed had their tax rates not changed) at the top, likely under-
estimate the effect that rising marginal tax rates have on taxable income. However, without 
adequate controls, mean reversion will tend to bias estimates in the opposite direction. Bias 
from mean reversion in the left tail of the income distribution can be mitigated by , impos-
ing a minimum income restriction on the sample. This technique cannot be used at the top of 
the income distribution because those at the top are the “treatment group” experiencing the 
tax change. 
Alternatives C through F may do a better job because they include at least one nonlinear 
component (i.e., a 10-piece spline) that allows for non-tax-related income changes that vary by 
income decile. Alternative F has the greatest likelihood of adequately controlling for the non-
tax effects because it includes separate and nonlinear controls for both mean reversion and di-
vergence within the income distribution. It is unlikely for these two separate phenomena to be 
adequately accounted for with just one variable (see Kopczuk 2005). However, the flexibility 
of the income splines is both a virtue and a vice. While the splines may control for the complex 
and heterogeneous secular trends across the income distribution, they may also absorb much 
of the independent variation in tax rates (see Feenberg 2009; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2009), 
which in turn may severely hamper identification. Variation in changes in state tax rates may 
mitigate this problem. 
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In addition to these controls, each specification is estimated after imposing income floors 
of $10,000 and $50,000 to the sample. The floors are imposed on only the base year of each 
paired observation. Imposing the floor on both the base and subsequent year could introduce 
bias since some near the threshold would be included in the sample if their income rose but 
excluded if it fell. Because the tax changes target upper-income filers, these floors will not ex-
clude those experiencing a federal tax change but will alter the sample of filers used to identify 
counterfactual behavior (absent a tax change).20 Recall that mean reversion is especially pro-
nounced at the tails of the distribution. 
Tax Rate Imputations and Instruments 
Federal marginal tax rates from income and payroll taxes are imputed using the CBO’s 
federal tax model, and state rates are imputed using Bakija’s state tax calculator (Bakija 2009). 
An instrument for the NTR is constructed by inflating base-year income by the growth in 
mean gross income over the (one-, three-, or six-year) interval between the base and subse-
quent year. Next, the tax calculator computes counterfactual tax rates based on the inflated in-
come measure. The tax calculator does not simply match tax returns to a federal tax bracket. It 
is much more sophisticated and takes into account many of the intricacies of the tax code (such 
as phaseouts), which can lead to a difference between statutory and effective MTRs. While the 
instrument is exogenous because it is not influenced by behavior between the base and subse-
quent year (of each paired observation), it does not perfectly reflect what tax rates would have 
been had a tax change not occurred. The same obstacles that make it difficult to predict what 
income would have been absent a tax change (e.g., mean reversion and divergence across the 
income distribution) also make it difficult to predict what MTRs would have been since these 
are also a function of income. 
In section 4, tax rates always include state, federal, and payroll taxes. A couple of studies 
have compared responses to state rates to responses from federal rates. For the 1980s, Gruber 
and Saez (2002) and Giertz (2007) report nearly identical estimates (of around 0.4) indepen-
dent of whether they include only variation from federal tax rates or variation from both fed-
eral and state rates. When including only variation from state rates, however. Gruber and Saez 
report a much larger ETI estimate of 0.63—although, this estimate is not statistically different 
from 0. Employing a much larger data set, Giertz reports a statistically significant estimate of 
0.34 when including only variation from state rates. For the 1990s, Giertz finds a similar pat-
tern—reporting an estimate of 0.11 (although not statistically significant) when including only 
variation from state rates and an estimate of about 0.2 both when including only variation 
from federal rates (and when including both federal and state rates). Gruber and Saez explain 
their larger estimated response to state rate changes by suggesting that state taxes could influ-
ence migration patterns (between states) and income shifting between states. Another possibil-
ity, consistent with Giertz’s finding, is that migration could result in the capitalization of state 
tax changes in pretax incomes. Thus, instead of falling in response to a state tax increase, for 
example, out-migration may result in higher pretax equilibrium wages—that is, state tax rates 
may be endogenous. 
20. The income cutoffs are based on gross income in 1992 dollars. The $10,000 cutoff is similar to the restriction 
imposed by Gruber and Saez (2002). The $50,000 cutoff is similar to that used by Carroll (1998). A $30,000 in-
come cutoff was also employed, but these results are not presented. In most cases, estimates when employing 
a $30,000 income cutoff lie in between similarly estimated coefficients when employing $10,000 and $50,000 
income cutoffs. In general, these estimates are closer to those found when using a $50,000 income cutoff. 
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Income Weighting 
Beginning with Gruber and Saez (2002), several articles in the ETI literature weight regres-
sions by income. Income weighting weights the data by each filer’s base-year income. Thus, 
an income-weighted ETI should reflect the percent change in total taxable income (associated 
with a 1% increase in the NTR)—instead of the average of individual percent changes. For ex-
ample, consider two taxpayers; Person 1 has income of $10,000, and person 2 has income of $1 
million. In response to a 1% decrease in the NTR, suppose that person 1 reduces his income 
(by 0.2%) to $9,980 and that person 2’s income falls (by 1%) to $990,000. In this instance, the 
unweighted ETI equals 0.60 × [(0.2 + 1)/(2)], whereas the income-weighted measure is nearly 
two-thirds larger, at 0.99 × {100 × [(20 + 10,000)/(10,000 + 1,000,000)]}. 
A meaningful average overall ETI must take into account the correlation between income 
and the elasticities. Income weighting does this by placing much more emphasis on responses 
at the top of the income distribution and, thus, is designed to yield results that are indicative 
of the overall income response (and tax revenue change) resulting from a change in tax rates. 
Note that if responses do not vary by income, then weighting will not affect ETI estimates. 
However, research consistently finds that estimated ETIs rise with income.21 If responses vary 
by income, a single overall elasticity will not be applicable when considering the impact of 
rate changes that target only part of the income distribution or for rate changes that differ 
across the distribution. 
Sample Weighting 
While some of the regressions are weighted by income, all regressions are weighted to ad-
just for the nonrandom sampling properties of the SOI data. Selection into the SOI data set 
is conditional on several factors, including income. Sampling probabilities reach 100% for 
very high income filers. The sample is also constructed such that once a filer is sampled, he 
will continue to be sampled in all subsequent years, so long as his income increases (and his 
other characteristics, such as filing status, do not change). In fact, the probability that one is 
observed in two different years is simply the minimum of the sampling probabilities for the 
two years. Without weighting, that sampling strategy raises the potential for spurious corre-
lation between the dependent variable [ln(incomeit+k/incomeit)] and the independent variables, 
including the tax variable. To avoid that possibility, (paired) observations are weighted by the 
reciprocal of their probability of appearing in the sample. That strategy is discussed in Auten 
and Carroll (1999), who also employ the strategy using SOI data.22 
21. People with higher incomes generally have more opportunities to respond to tax changes. They generally 
itemize their tax returns, rely less on wage and salary income, and have more control over the timing and 
sources of their income than do other groups. People with more modest incomes can change their labor sup-
ply or alter the degree to which they use certain deductions and exemptions but likely have relatively few al-
ternatives to alter their taxable income. 
22. Income weights that account for the sample design are produced by simply multiplying income by the 
weights used to adjust for the SOI’s nonrandom properties. Within a least-squares framework, weighted 
estimates are produced by minimizing the sum of squared errors multiplied by the square root of the 
weights. 
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4. Results 
Figure 2 presents income shares and marginal tax rates for the top 1% of taxpayers who 
were the focus of the 1990s tax increases. Consistent with findings reported by Parcell (1995), 
Sammartino and Weiner (1997), and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009), Figure 2 suggests a clear 
short-term behavioral response but not necessarily a longer-term response—while also exhib-
iting patterns that highlight the difficulty in finding robust estimates of behavioral responses. 
Note that while the top one percent’s share of income rises by 10.7% from 1989 to 1996, 
their share of income decreases sharply from 1990 to 1991 and from 1992 to 1993, the years in 
which top tax rates increase. The spike in income shares in 1990 and 1992 suggests these tax-
payers shifted income to the year prior to the tax increase. As rates on earned income increase 
further from 1993 to 1994, the share of income held by the top 1% is flat, possibly suggest-
ing that it is more costly to shift earned income than other income sources. Further note that, 
from 1989 to 1990 and from 1994 to 1996 (i.e., years that do not precede a tax increase), the 
share of income accruing to the top 1% increases sharply—and, as alluded to earlier, this up-
ward trend appears to dominate any longer-term behavioral responses from the tax increases. 
While the trend in the income share at the top, when tax rates are not changing, is decidedly 
upward, the trend for those below the top 1% is flat.23 Even the next 9% of the income distri-
bution (which was not affected by the increased income tax rates but was modestly affected 
Figure 2. Top 1% Income Share and Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
Source: Effective federal income tax rates and income shares are from Saez (2004). Income excludes realized cap-
ital gains. Social Security, and unemployment benefits. Payroll tax rates are imputed by the author. State tax 
rates are not included. 
23. Of course, income shares arc a relative measure, and gains for the top 1% must be exactly offset by losses to 
the rest of the distribution. However, the gains are concentrated primarily within the top 1% of the distribu-
tion, while the (relative) losses are spread over the other 99%, a much larger group. 
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by the raising of the health insurance tax cap) does not show signs of the income shifting (in 
the years surrounding the tax changes) evident in Figure 2; over the seven years, patterns for 
the next 9% are pacific by comparison, trending upward slightly (see Saez 2004). Because Fig-
ure 2 is based on repeated cross sections—that is, it focuses on the top 1% in each year, inde-
pendent of where these filers fell in the income distribution in other years—it is not influenced 
by mean reversion. On the other hand, panel data analysis is influenced by mean reversion 
since a filer in the top 1% of the distribution in a base year could be below the top 1% in the 
prospective year. Because of mean reversion, year-to-year income changes for those (starting) 
in the top 1% are about 6.5 percentage points lower for the panel than for the cross section. 
And, as the distance between the base and subsequent year increases, this difference tends to 
widen. For upper-income groups below the top 1%, the impact of mean reversion is substan-
tially subdued. 
While the patterns in Figure 2 are consistent with behavioral responses to the 1990s tax in-
creases, this evidence (from repeated cross sections) is suggestive at best, given the number of 
factors that influence income, which are uncontrolled for. The regression analysis will attempt 
to sort out these factors. However, the volatile nature of top incomes and the heterogeneous 
income trends across the distribution suggest that, even with sophisticated controls (see the 
previous section), identification may be tenuous. 
Next begins discussion of the regression results by focusing on a specification that ex-
cludes any income controls. These estimates are clearly not identified because of unobserved 
heterogeneity; however, focusing first on these estimates may serve as a good starting point 
before examining the more sophisticated models. Next, focus shifts to income-weighted es-
timates from the specification with the richest set of income controls. Then these estimates 
are compared to estimates from specifications that employ alternative income controls. Fi-
nally, the section examines the implications of income weighting the estimates and the in-
fluence from adding adjacent-year rate changes to the model. Before proceeding, recall that, 
consistent with the vast majority of the ETI literature, elasticities are estimated with respect 
to the NTR (i.e., 1 – τ); thus, theory predicts that elasticity estimates should be greater than 
or equal to zero. 
Estimates without Income Controls 
The first row of Table 2 presents income-weighted ETI estimates when including no in-
come controls—but including demographics. The first row of Table 3 presents analogous 
unweighted (i.e., not income-weighted) estimates. Over both one- and three-year intervals, 
the estimates are somewhat larger when imposing the higher $50,000 base-year income cut-
off (for inclusion in the sample). This is consistent with mean reversion in the left tail. Some 
at the bottom of the distribution experience income increases because they are initially well 
below their average (or permanent) income—possibly because they are in school or for other 
reasons are not fully employed. Since this group does not experience a tax change, they are 
part of the “control” group, and thus mean reversion biases the baseline income trend (i.e., 
the trend absent tax changes) upward. When the NTR is falling, this will bias ETI estimates 
downward. 
A second observation from the first rows of Tables 2 and 3 is that the estimated ETI in-
creases as the interval over which behavior is measured is increased. With a $50,000 income 
cutoff, the estimates rise from (a statistically insignificant) 0.2 when measuring behavior of 
single-year intervals to 1.57 and 1.78 when measuring behavior over three- and six-year in-
tervals, respectively. This (again without income controls) suggests very large longer-term 
422 sE th h. gi E r tz i n Sou th er n ec on om i c Jou r na l 77 (2010) 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 In
co
m
e-
W
ei
gh
te
d 
ET
I E
st
im
at
es
 w
ith
ou
t A
dj
ac
en
t-
Ye
ar
 C
on
tr
ol
s: 
19
89
–1
99
5
   
   
 Y
ea
rs
 b
et
w
ee
n 
pa
ire
d 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
O
ne
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
hr
ee
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  S
ix
   
   
 In
co
m
e 
cu
to
ff 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $
10
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  $
50
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $
10
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $
50
k 
   
   
   
   
   
  $
10
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $
50
k 
  
In
co
m
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  (
1)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  (
2)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
(3
) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (
4)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
(5
) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (
6)
N
on
e 
–0
.0
14
 (
0.
07
9)
 
0.
20
4*
* 
(0
.0
81
) 
1.
40
9*
* 
(0
.1
30
) 
1.
57
4*
* 
(0
.1
44
) 
1.
80
3*
* 
(0
.2
78
) 
1.
78
3*
* 
(0
.2
92
) 
A
. l
n(
in
co
m
e it
) 
–0
.3
42
 (
0.
08
1)
 
–0
.2
55
 (
0.
07
6)
 
–0
.0
25
 (
0.
09
7)
 
0.
20
6 
(0
.1
52
) 
–0
.0
59
 (
0.
16
7)
 
0.
2 
(0
.2
66
) 
B.
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
an
d 
–0
.0
26
 (
0.
07
3)
 
0.
18
6*
* 
(0
.0
89
) 
–0
.0
15
 (
0.
10
3)
 
0.
22
 (
0.
15
9)
 
–0
.0
63
 (
0.
17
7)
 
0.
17
2 
(0
.2
61
) 
   
   
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
)
C
. 1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
) 
–0
.1
41
 (
0.
07
6)
 
–0
.1
77
 (
0.
07
5)
 
0.
30
0*
* 
(0
.1
31
) 
0.
54
3*
* 
(0
.1
82
) 
0.
42
4 
(0
.2
64
) 
0.
47
4 
(0
.3
40
) 
D
.1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
an
d 
 
0.
00
7 
(0
.0
75
) 
0.
19
4*
* 
(0
.0
91
) 
0.
36
**
 (
0.
12
5)
 
0.
34
4*
* 
(0
.1
65
) 
0.
45
1*
 (
0.
25
5)
 
0.
34
2 
(0
.2
89
) 
   
   
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
)
E.
 1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
 
–0
.0
23
 (
0.
07
4)
 
0.
18
8*
* 
(0
.0
89
) 
–0
.0
52
 (
0.
10
2)
 
0.
19
6 
(0
.1
54
) 
–0
.0
37
 (
0.
17
9)
 
0.
16
4 
(0
.2
59
) 
   
   
 a
nd
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
F. 
10
-p
ie
ce
 s
pl
in
e 
of
 b
ot
h 
ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
 
0.
00
0 
(0
.0
75
) 
0.
18
8*
* 
(0
.0
91
) 
0.
31
4*
* 
(0
.1
23
) 
0.
32
8*
* 
(0
.1
63
) 
0.
43
6*
 (
0.
25
3)
 
0.
34
2 
(0
.2
88
) 
   
   
 a
nd
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
Tw
o-
st
ag
e 
le
as
t-
sq
ua
re
s 
es
tim
at
es
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
pa
ne
l o
f t
ax
 r
et
ur
ns
 (
se
e 
A
pp
en
di
x)
. R
ob
us
t 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s 
(c
lu
st
er
ed
 b
y 
ta
x 
fil
er
) 
ar
e 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 
ln
(in
co
m
e it
+1
/in
co
m
e it
). 
A
ll 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
ye
ar
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s, 
du
m
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
fil
er
 t
yp
e,
 it
em
iz
er
 s
ta
tu
s, 
an
d 
po
ly
no
m
ia
ls
 o
f a
ge
. R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 a
re
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 t
he
 in
ve
rs
e 
of
 s
am
pl
in
g 
pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
by
 in
co
m
e 
(s
ee
 S
ec
tio
n 
3)
.
* 
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
at
 t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l.
**
  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
at
 t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l.
El as ti c i ty o f tax a bl E in c o m E d u r i n g th E 1990s: nE w Es ti mat E s an d an aly s E s     423
Ta
bl
e 
3.
 U
nw
ei
gh
te
d 
ET
I E
st
im
at
es
 w
ith
ou
t A
dj
ac
en
t-
Ye
ar
 C
on
tr
ol
s: 
19
89
–1
99
5
   
   
 Y
ea
rs
 b
et
w
ee
n 
pa
ire
d 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
O
ne
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  T
hr
ee
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  S
ix
   
   
 In
co
m
e 
cu
to
ff 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
$1
0k
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
$5
0k
   
   
   
   
   
   
 $
10
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
$5
0k
   
   
   
   
   
   
  $
10
k 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  $
50
k 
  
In
co
m
e 
co
nt
ro
ls
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (
1)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
(2
) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (
3)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
(4
) 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (
5)
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
(6
)
N
on
e 
0.
06
9 
(0
.3
80
) 
0.
40
3*
 (
0.
22
3)
 
0.
25
1*
* 
(0
.1
09
) 
0.
75
6*
* 
(0
.1
27
) 
1.
40
8*
* 
(0
.3
90
) 
0.
95
3*
* 
(0
.2
45
) 
A
. l
n(
in
co
m
e it
) 
–2
.9
04
 (
0.
32
0)
 
–0
.2
08
5 
(0
.2
64
) 
–0
.5
55
 (
0.
09
8)
 
–0
.1
5 
(0
.1
16
) 
–0
.5
65
 (
0.
15
4)
 
–0
.3
82
 (
0.
24
0)
 
B.
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
an
d 
–0
.9
82
 (
0.
31
4)
 
–0
.2
85
 (
0.
20
6)
 
–0
.4
6 
(0
.1
00
) 
–0
.0
45
 (
0.
12
4)
 
–0
.8
57
 (
0.
17
1)
 
–0
.3
44
 (
0.
28
4)
 
   
   
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
)
C
. 1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
) 
–0
.6
96
 (
0.
43
3)
 
–0
.1
02
 (
0.
23
1)
 
–0
.2
92
 (
0.
10
2)
 
0.
18
1 
(0
.1
43
) 
–0
.0
84
 (
0.
17
8)
 
–0
.0
24
 (
0.
27
5)
 
D
.1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
an
d 
 
0.
11
3 
(0
.5
16
) 
0.
23
4 
(0
.2
79
) 
–0
.2
47
 (
0.
10
5)
 
0.
09
2 
(0
.1
35
) 
–0
.4
88
 (
0.
19
7)
 
–0
.1
54
 (
0.
30
6)
 
   
   
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
)
E.
 1
0-
pi
ec
e 
sp
lin
e 
of
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
 
–0
.6
02
 (
0.
31
9)
 
–0
.1
41
 (
0.
21
0)
 
–0
.3
09
 (
0.
09
8)
 
0.
00
3 
(0
.1
25
) 
–0
.6
34
 (
0.
18
5)
 
–0
.1
38
 (
0.
28
2)
 
   
   
 a
nd
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
F. 
10
-p
ie
ce
 s
pl
in
e 
of
 b
ot
h 
ln
(in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
 
0.
06
5 
(0
.4
97
) 
0.
16
2 
(0
.2
73
) 
–0
.1
98
 (
0.
10
4)
 
0.
06
7 
(0
.1
34
) 
–0
.4
08
 (
0.
21
3)
 
–0
.1
12
 (
0.
30
0)
 
   
   
 a
nd
 ln
(in
co
m
e it
/in
co
m
e it
–1
) 
Tw
o-
st
ag
e 
le
as
t-
sq
ua
re
s 
es
tim
at
es
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
pa
ne
l o
f t
ax
 r
et
ur
ns
 (
se
e 
A
pp
en
di
x)
. R
ob
us
t 
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s 
(c
lu
st
er
ed
 b
y 
ta
x 
fil
er
) 
ar
e 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 
ln
(in
co
m
e it
+1
/in
co
m
e it
). 
A
ll 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
ye
ar
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s, 
du
m
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
fil
er
 t
yp
e,
 it
em
iz
er
 s
ta
tu
s, 
an
d 
po
ly
no
m
ia
ls
 o
f a
ge
. R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 a
re
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 t
he
 in
ve
rs
e 
of
 s
am
pl
in
g 
pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
by
 in
co
m
e 
(s
ee
 S
ec
tio
n 
3)
.
* 
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
at
 t
he
 1
0%
 le
ve
l.
**
  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
at
 t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l.
424 sE th h. gi E r tz i n Sou th er n ec on om i c Jou r na l 77 (2010) 
responsiveness and modest short-term responsiveness, which is seemingly inconsistent with 
the patterns in Figure 2. However, here the difference likely results from mean reversion at 
the top of the income distribution. Recall that Figure 2 is based on repeated cross sections of 
data (so mean reversion is not present) and that, with panel data, mean reversion is more se-
vere the greater the time between observations. For the period examined in this article, Kop-
czuk, Saez, and Song (2010) find that from a group initially in the top 1% of the income dis-
tribution, roughly 78% will remain in the top 1 % after one year, 70% after three years, and 
65% after five years. Thus, while Figure 2 suggests larger short-term (and smaller longer-
term) elasticities, over the longer interval, mean reversion (of top incomes) in the panel data 
more than offset this. Note that the biggest mean-reverting income drops are at the top of 
the income distribution (i.e., the “treatment” group) and many times will be spuriously cor-
related with a falling NTR. 
In the context of the ETI literature, the end-year approach without income controls is 
(among the approaches explored in this article) procedurally the closest to the approach ap-
plied by Feldstein (1995) to TRA 86. There are substantive differences between the two ap-
proaches; however, both rely on two years of panel data, employ differences-in-differences, 
and do not include additional controls for mean reversion or divergence in the income dis-
tribution. It is noteworthy that this approach results in very large estimates (about 1.8 with 
income weighting and from 0.95 to 1.41 without income weighting). These estimates are 
similar in magnitude to Feldstein’s—even though MTRs are rising in the 1990s and falling 
after TRA 86. 
Estimates with the Richest Set of Income Controls (Specification E) 
Employing the richest set of income controls (i.e., the two 10-piece splines) and impos-
ing a $50,000 income cutoff (which mitigates mean reversions at the left tail of the income dis-
tribution without removing observations from the “treatment” group experiencing the tax 
increases) yields income-weighted estimated ETIs ranging from 0.19, when measuring re-
sponses over single-year intervals, to 0.33, when measuring responses over three-year inter-
vals. When lowering the income cutoff to $10,000, this range now spans from 0 to 0.31. In 
all but two cases, lowering the income cutoff and employing either one- or three-year dif-
ferences yields lower estimated elasticities—in some cases substantially lower. As discussed 
in section 3, for the 1990s, the effect of lowering the income cutoff is primarily to expand the 
“control” group not experiencing a tax change. With the lower-income cutoff, mean rever-
sion in the left tail may bias counterfactual income growth rates (for those experiencing a tax 
change) upward, which will bias ETI estimates downward, in, for example, the 1990s, when 
the NTR (for top income groups) is falling (see row F of Table 2). The general finding that lon-
ger-term estimates are somewhat larger than for the shorter term, which is also evident when 
imposing the richest set of income controls, is consistent with findings by Heim (2007) for the 
1990s. But it is in contrast to findings by Sammartino and Weiner (1997) and Goolsbee (2000), 
who, for OBRA 93, find evidence of large short-term (or transitory) responses and much less 
evidence of a substantial longer-term response. It may be that the controls used here effec-
tively separate the non-tax-related income trends from the tax effect, and the longer-term re-
sponse is in fact larger (than for the shorter term), in which case it may be that many filers 
arc limited in their ability to respond to taxes in the short run, but over the longer term they 
have time to respond by recharacterizing income, changing jobs and investment decisions 
(including investments in human capital). However, the possibility that these controls do not 
fully account for mean reversion at the top cannot be ruled out—in which case residual mean 
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reversion could be biasing estimates upward, with the bias increasing with the interval be-
tween paired observations. This is what was observed (to a much larger degree) in the speci-
fications that exclude income controls. 
When measuring behavior over a six-year interval, the estimated ETI (when imposing the 
$50,000 income cutoff) is almost the same as the estimate using three-year intervals; however, 
the standard errors are much larger, and that estimate is not statistically different from 0. In 
fact, estimates in this article (for the 1990s) that use just the two end years are almost always sta-
tistically insignificant. This reinforces a conclusion from Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009, p. 25) 
that “no convincing estimates of the ETI can be obtained with a panel analysis using only two 
years of data when the tax rate changes are concentrated in a single part of the distribution.” 
For comparison purposes, the end-year analysis is repeated for TRA 86, using years 1985 
and 1989, These estimates here are often statistically significant. With the richest set of income 
controls (specification F), the income-weighted estimates range from 0.39, with a $10,000 in-
come cutoff, to 0.67. with a $50,000 income cutoff Rate changes from TRA 86 were substan-
tial and changed by different amounts across a broad range of the income distribution and 
thus were not concentrated in one part of the income distribution. This additional cross-sec-
tional variation may allow for more precise estimates for TRA 86, even with just two years 
of data. Another difference between the end-year approaches is that the interval between the 
start (1985) and end year (1989) is four years for the 1980s and six years for the 1990s (1989- 
1995). The greater the interval between paired observations, the more likely it is that unob-
served factors are having a substantial influence on income growth. However, even when ap-
plying the end-year approach to years 1992 and 1993, Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) report 
estimated elasticities (for AGI) that are not robust—in fact, with flexible income controls, their 
estimates are negative (i.e., the “wrong” sign) and very large in absolute magnitude. Finally, 
while the standard errors are more modest for the 1980s, that does not mean that responses are 
accurately identified or robust. In fact, estimates from the ETI literature on the 1980s are not 
particularly robust. In the remainder of this article, little attention is paid to the end-year ap-
proach for the 1990s. The large standard errors found here (for the 1990s) limit inferences that 
can be made about the size of the ETI from this approach. 
Sensitivity to Income Controls 
Employing alternative income controls yields a range of estimated ETIs24 (see Table 2 
and Figure 3). Figure 3 presents the estimated coefficients from Table 2 graphically in order 
to better visualize how the estimates vary depending on income controls, income cutoffs, 
and the number of years over which behavioral changes are measured. For the short term, 
the elasticity estimates are negative when including base-year income either in log form or 
as a 10-piece spline of the log (specifications A and C)—two approaches employed by Gru-
ber and Saez. With a $50,000 income cutoff, the other three alternatives (B, D, and E) yield 
short-term ETI estimates that are almost identical to the estimate from specification F (0.19), 
which includes two 10-piece splines (see the second group of estimates in Figure 3). Each of 
these three alternative specifications includes separate controls for mean reversion and di-
vergence in the income distribution but differs as to whether the controls are in spline form 
or as single logged variables. For the year-to-year analysis, it is surprising that the flexibil-
24. These estimates are compared to estimates that employ the most comprehensive set of income controls—that 
is, 10- piece splines of both the log of lagged income and the log change between base-year income and the 
lag. 
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ity of the spline to control separately for differing trends across the income distribution has 
virtually no effect on the estimates or standard errors. These estimates, when including both 
sets of income controls, are smaller than both the 0.38–0.56 range reported by Carroll (1998) 
and the 0.46 estimated by Heim (2007)—all of which are also based on year-to-year differ-
ences for the 1990s. However, Carroll does not weight estimates by income, and both stud-
ies employ different sets of control variables. Carroll does not include nonlinear income con-
trols but does include industry and occupation dummies. His methodology also deviates 
from mine in a couple of other respects— including the approach for imputing tax rates and 
the construction of the instrument for the tax rate. Heim includes flexible income controls 
based on average income measures. In a sensitivity test, he employs a specification very sim-
ilar to my specification F (which includes separate nonlinear income controls), reporting a 
statistically insignificant estimate of –0.08. As discussed shortly. Heim includes data from 
1987 in his analysis—the implementation year for TRA 86—which may account for the dif-
ference between his estimate and mine. 
In comparison to my longer-term ETI estimate of 0.33 (specification F), Gruber and Saez’s 
controls (specifications A and C), when imposing a $50,000 income cutoff, yield income-
weighted estimated ETIs of 0.2 and 0.54, respectively—with only the second of these statisti-
cally different from 0. Employing Gruber and Saez’s richest specification (specification C), my 
estimate of 0.54 falls to 0.3 when lowering the income cutoff from $50,000 to $10,000 (Gruber 
and Saez’s cutoff). Interestingly, when expanding the range of the data (from 198925 to 1995) 
Figure 3. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates for the 1990s 
Source: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995. Estimates are from 2SLS regres-
sions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see Section 3). 
25. Data from 1988 are included only in specifications B, D, E, and F, all of which include variables based on 
lagged income. 
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to extend from 1988 to 2001, Giertz (2007) reports a longer-term estimated ETI of 0.2 for spec-
ification C when employing a $10,000 income cutoff. The difference between these estimates 
could be driven by the inclusion of base year 1988 (which includes variation in tax rates) but 
more likely results from the inclusion of years after 1995, which could alter the estimated base-
line income trend. From 1996 to 2000, the share of income accruing to the top 1 % grew (at 
an annualized rate) over four times as fast as it did during years 1989-1995 (Piketty and Saez 
2003)—while federal statutory tax rates (applying to ordinary income) remained unchanged. 
Heim (2007) also produces estimates based on differencing over three-year intervals. His most 
preferred specification yields an ETI estimate of 0.58. However, when excluding years 1987 
and 1988, this estimate jumps to 1.58. Note that 1987 and 1988 were important phase-in year 
for TRA 86 where top marginal tax rates fell substantially. 
My other three specifications (that again include separate controls for mean reversion and 
divergence in the income distribution but differ as to whether these variables are included as 
splines or logged variables) yield longer-term estimates ranging from 0.2 to 0.34. The only sta-
tistically significant estimate from these three alternatives is 0.34 (specification D), which is 
from the model that includes the log change between lagged and base-year income in spline 
form and the log of lagged income as a single variable. Adding the second control in spline 
form (specification F) does almost nothing to the estimated ETI or standard error. Note that 
statistical significance varies across the choice of income controls because of changes to the es-
timated coefficient and not because of changes to the precision of the estimates. Standard er-
rors vary little across these specifications. 
Sensitivity to Income Weighting and to the Definition of Income 
Following Gruber and Saez (2002), most panel studies focus on the ETI income-weight 
regressions. Recall from the previous section that, if the ETI is independent of base-year 
income (and the model adequately controls for other factors), income-weighted and un-
weighted estimates should be the same. In contrast to Table 2, Table 3 reports unweighted 
ETI estimates that are either negative (contrary to theory) or modestly positive. See also Fig-
ure 4, which is analogous to Figure 3 but presents unweighted (instead of income-weighted) 
estimates. For specifications that include income controls, estimates are never both positive 
and statistically significant—and, in general, standard errors are much larger for the un-
weighted estimates. A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 is consistent with findings throughout 
the literature that the ETI increases with income. More precisely, because the 1990s tax in-
creases targeted the top 1% of the income distribution, the comparison of unweighted and 
income-weighted estimates suggests that within the top 1%, the ETI increases with income. 
With the richest set of income controls (two 10-piece splines), unweighted ETI estimates, 
when imposing a $50,000 income cutoff, range from 0.16 when measuring responses over 
one-year intervals to 0.07 when measuring responses over three-year intervals. Not only 
are these estimates much smaller than the comparable income-weighted estimates of 0.19 
and 0.33, respectively, but without income weighting, the estimated short-term elasticity is 
larger than the longer-term estimate—the reverse of the income-weighted finding. However, 
because the unweighted estimates are not statistically significant (standard errors for the un-
weighted year-to-year estimates are three times as large as for the income-weighted specifi-
cation), little can be inferred from this finding. 
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Consistent with Gruber and Saez (2002), Giertz (2007) and others, estimated elasticities are 
almost always smaller for broader measures of income. Table 4 reports income-weighted elas-
ticity estimates for gross income (which includes exemptions and standard or itemized deduc-
tions). Elasticities for broader income measures are likely smaller (than for taxable income) 
because taxpayers have fewer margins to alter the broader measure and a given change in in-
come represents a smaller percentage of the broader measure. Also, when tax rates change, 
there is not necessarily an incentive to lower gross income—only taxable income, which is a 
subset of gross income.26 The smaller elasticity estimates for gross income suggest that the re-
sponsiveness of itemized deductions may be an important component of the ETI. 
Accounting for Adjacent-Year Tax Rate Changes 
Section 3 discussed how including (logs of the) lag and lead changes in the NTR can po-
tentially separate transitory from longer-term income responses. This approach is performed 
using the sample of paired observations measuring behavior over single-year intervals. Table 
5 presents results from specification F, which includes both sets of 10-piece splines. The esti-
mated short-term response (0.43) is much larger than for the earlier specification that excludes 
adjacent-year rate changes (0.19), and incorporating the lag and lead rate changes suggests a 
much larger longer-term response. For example, the estimated coefficients for the lead and 
26. In theory, one could have all his/her income in nontaxable forms (e.g., returns from tax-exempt bonds), in 
which case an increase in tax rates applying to taxable income should not alter behavior. 
Figure 4. Person-Weighted ETI Estimates for the 1990s 
Source; Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1989 to 1995. Estimates are from 2SLS regres-
sions. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see Section 3). 
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concurrent rate changes sum to 0.78, and adding to this the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
rate change raises the overall elasticity to 1.46. This is in stark contrast to findings from Gools-
bee (2000) and Hall and Liebman (2000) for executives.27 For the first half of the 1990s, Gools-
bee reports short-term elasticity estimates often in excess of 1 and much smaller longer-term 
estimates ranging from 0 to 0.4 (when adding estimated coefficients from the lead and concur-
rent tax rates). Hall and Liebman argue that even short-term responses may be modest—and 
that the apparent large short-term elasticity estimates reported by Goolsbee could be due to 
stock market performance and the exercising of prior stock options.28 
While in this article this approach yields longer-term estimates that are larger than the ma-
jority of estimates found in the more recent ETI literature, these estimates should be treated 
with caution. Recall from the previous section the alternative interpretations for the lead and 
lag coefficients. In addition to any delayed or anticipatory response to tax rate changes, these 
estimated coefficients could be influenced by concurrent tax responses that influence income 
in adjacent years (where income in an adjacent year is also used in constructing the dependent 
variable for the preceding or succeeding year). To the extent that estimates for the lead and lag 
coefficients are driven by this second effect, they should not be interpreted as part of the elas-
ticity. It may be that the lead and lag rate changes are capturing a combination of delayed and 
anticipatory responses as well as these other effects. It is impossible to tell if or to what degree 
this is true. 
Table 5. Income-Weighted ETI Estimates with Adjacent-Year Controls: 1989-1995 
 (1) 
ln ( 1 – τit+1 )  0.425** (0,112)         1 – τit 
ln (  1 – τit  )  0.683** (0.094)      1 – τit–1
ln ( 1 – τit+2  )  0.354** (0.111)        1 – τit+1
Two-stage least-squares estimates are based on a panel of tax returns (see Appendix). Robust standard er-
rors (clustered by tax filer) are in parentheses. The dependent variable is ln(incomeit+1/incomeit) and two 
10-piece splines are included to control for mean reversion and changes to the distribution of income. 
The regression includes year fixed effects, dummies for filer type, itemizer status, and polynomials of age. 
The regression is weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income, and a $50,000 base-
year income cutoff is imposed on the sample (see section 3). 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
27. A caveat is in order when comparing these results to Goolsbee and Hall and Liebman. In addition to focus-
ing on a select subset of taxpayers, Goolsbee and Hall and Liebman do not use tax return data for their anal-
yses. Because of data limitations, their taxable income measures are not as comprehensive as those calculated 
using IRS tax data. As a result, their taxable income measures could be better characterized as earned income 
before deductions. Even the measure of earned income is not comprehensive because it does not include in-
come from other family members or income earned outside the firm (included in the executive database). 
28. Heim (2007), in examining the 1990s tax increase, also estimates a model that includes adjacent-year rates 
changes: however, he differences observations over three-year intervals (instead of over a single year). He re-
ports an estimated coefficient on the concurrent change in the NTR of 1.47, but the estimated coefficients on 
the lag and lead variables are negative and large in absolute magnitude. Summing all three estimated coeffi-
cients yields an overall estimate of -0.31. 
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5. Conclusion 
This article employs variations of a differencing methodology to panels of IRS tax return 
data for the 1990s in order to estimate short- and longer-run responses of taxable (and gross) 
income to changes in tax rates. In addition to varying the time interval over which behavior is 
measured, sensitivity tests are conducted by exploring different combinations of control vari-
ables as well as alternative weighting strategies and methods for separating short- from lon-
ger-term responses. 
In general, income-weighted estimates are somewhat larger when behavior is measured 
over three-year intervals as opposed to over one-year intervals. This is in contrast to some of 
the literature that has found large short-term responses to the 1990s tax changes but smaller 
longer-term responses. When including the richest set of income controls, income-weighted 
ETI estimates range from 0.19 when differencing over single-year intervals to 0.33 when dif-
ferencing over three-year intervals. Estimates from an end-year approach, while sometimes 
large, are not statistically different from 0, suggesting that, at least for this period, there is not 
enough variation to identify responses with just two years of data. Adding adjacent-year tax 
rates to the model, which could capture delayed and anticipatory responses to tax changes, 
yields much larger estimates. With this approach, estimates range from 0.43 over the short 
term and from 0.78 to 1.46 when accounting for delayed and anticipatory responses. However, 
the lag and lead tax rate changes could also be capturing other factors, cautioning against plac-
ing too much stock in these estimates. 
While Chetty (2009) provides an alternative explanation for the range of estimates found in 
the literature, divergence within the income distribution still remains one of the most intran-
sigent obstacles to correctly identifying the ETI. The fact that the divergence in incomes has 
persisted through periods of both increases and decreases in the level and progressivity of tax 
rates suggests that it is, in large part, not a direct response to tax changes. However, the possi-
bility that the phenomenon results from a longer-run more nuanced response to the lowering 
of marginal tax rates on top income since World War II cannot be ruled out (see Piketty and 
Saez 2007 and Saez and Veall 2005). 
While more sophisticated control variables yield more robust estimates, estimates are still 
sensitive to reasonable a priori specification decisions. This is true throughout the literature 
and reflects the inherent complexity of separating responses to changes in tax rates from the 
many other factors that also influence income. A continuing obstacle to identification is that 
the most sophisticated income controls, which are most likely to adequately control for mean 
reversion and divergence within the income distribution, are also the most likely to absorb 
much of the independent variation in tax rates, also needed for identification. 
Appendix: U.S. Tax Return Data 
The estimation of behavioral responses of reported income to tax changes relies on the availability of high-
quality individual income tax data. The IRS’s SOI division has created large annual micro data sets of individ-
ual tax returns since 1960. The SOI data are stratified random samples that, for the time period examined in 
this article, include roughly 125,000 tax returns per year and include most of the information reported on tax 
returns, plus some additional demographic information. Sampling rates vary by income (and other tax return 
characteristics). The SOI data heavily oversample high-income filers with 100% sampling rates at the top of 
the distribution, a key advantage because top incomes play a critical role in determining overall responses to 
changes in tax rates—especially for this article since the 1990s tax changes were concentrated at the top of the 
income distribution. 
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Selection into the SOI data set is conditional on several factors, including income. More specifically, each 
individual is assigned a number at random that does not change from year to year. For each year, tax returns 
are separated into strata based on AGI and the forms and schedules used by the filers. Sampling probabilities 
vary by strata and reach 100% for very high income filers. The returns in each stratum are sorted by the ran-
domly assigned values, and the strata sampling probability is used to determine the cut point for inclusion in 
the sample. Because the individual maintains the same random value over time and because the stratum sam-
pling probability simply determines the cut point for inclusion in the sample, once included in the SOI sam-
ple, an individual is automatically included in future years if his income remains the same or if his income 
increases because this would put him either in the same stratum or in a stratum with a higher sampling prob-
ability. Therefore, an individual observed in the base year is much more likely to be observed in the future 
year if his income rises than if it falls. In fact, the probability that one is observed in two different years is sim-
ply the minimum of the strata sampling probabilities for the two years. This raises the potential for spurious 
correlation between the dependent variable [ln(incomeit+k/incomeit)] and the independent variables, including 
the tax variable. As noted in Section 3, to avoid this possibility, (paired) observations are weighted by the re-
ciprocal of their probability of appearing in the sample. This same strategy is employed by a number of re-
searchers using these data. 
SOI releases a public use file version of annual cross sections of tax returns. However, these files do not in-
clude individual identifiers and thus cannot be used for panel data analysis. Additionally, public use files have a 
lower sampling rate at the very top of the income distribution (1/3 instead of 1) and exclude or blur some vari-
ables for those at the top of the income distribution. 
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